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1.  Introduction 
Innovating firms choose to patent their innovations when patenting allows the appropriation of more 
rents than do other forms of intellectual property protection (e.g., trade secrecy). The level of 
innovation rents that can be captured by the patent is mainly determined by the breadth of patent 
protection. Thus, once the decision to patent has been made, the innovator needs to make another 
important decision, namely, how broad of a patent protection to claim. While the innovator’s 
decision to patent the innovation or to keep it a secret has been examined in the literature 
(Horstmann et al. 1985, Waterson 1990), there is no formal framework of analysis of the 
innovator’s patent breadth choice. Instead, the traditional assumption in the economic literature is 
that the innovator has an incentive to claim ‘as much as possible’.  
  The effectiveness of a ‘claim as much as possible’ patent breadth strategy in maximizing the 
rents that can be appropriated by the patentee is questionable, however. A patent that is too broad 
increases the likelihood of both infringement and patent validity challenges by competitors and/or 
third parties (Merges and Nelson 1990). Consequently, broad patent protection may reduce the 
effective patent life and thus the innovation rents that can be captured with the patent, since patents 
are often revoked during infringement trials and patent validity challenges (Merges and Nelson 
1990, Barton 2000). This concern is especially critical given the increase in patent litigation during 
the last decade, particularly in the field of biotechnology, and the increase in the number of patents 
that are invalidated after being challenged. While the broadest possible patent may not be optimal, 
neither is a very narrow patent, since narrow patents make it easier for rivals to enter the patentee’s 
market and may not allow the patentee to capture enough returns to cover her R&D costs.  
The purpose of this paper is to theoretically examine the patenting behavior of innovators 
that have generated patentable process innovations and have decided to seek patent protection. In 
specific, the paper determines the privately optimal patent breadth for drastic process innovations 
when the innovator faces the probability of a direct patent validity challenge by a third party and 
potential entry in his market by competitors that provide technologically equivalent processes. The 
paper also examines the affect of patent breadth on the competitors’ incentive to generate a 
competing process (i.e., on the competitors’ R&D spending), on the competitors’ probability of 
success in the R&D process (i.e., the patentee’s ability to deter entry) and on the timing that success 
is realized by competitors (i.e., the patentee’s ability to delay entry).    3
The focus of the paper is on drastic process innovations because these innovations are 
usually granted broader protection by the Patent Office (EPO 2000a, USPTO 1999). Given that 
broad patents are challenged and invalidated more often than narrow ones (Waterson 1990, 
Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001, Merges and Nelson 1990), the innovator of a drastic process 
should be more careful when he determines the breadth of patent protection claimed as he cannot 
depend on the Patent Office for help in structuring his claims. In addition, drastic process 
innovations are associated with greater innovation rents, which increase the incentive of other 
parties to challenge the validity of the patent and to litigate (Harhoff and Reitzig 2000, Lanjouw and 
Schankerman 2001). 
The innovating firm’s patent breadth decision is determined in a sequential game between an 
incumbent innovator who decides on the breadth of patent protection claimed and a potential entrant 
who, having observed whether the patent was challenged or not, decides on whether to generate a 
competing process and how much to spend on R&D. The game is solved by backwards induction; 
the decisions of the potential entrant are examined first followed by the patentee’s patent breadth 
decision.  
Analytical results show that the optimal patent breadth depends on the affect of new entry on 
the incumbent’s profits, the incumbent’s legal costs incurred when the patent is challenged and on 
whether the incumbent operates under a short term or a long term horizon. A key result of the paper 
is that, even when a patent breadth that deters entry exists, it might not be profit maximizing for the 
incumbent to choose this patent breadth to deter entry. As well, claiming the maximum breadth of 
patent protection is never an optimal strategy for the incumbent patentee in this model. The analysis 
shows that the nature of the instantaneous probability of success is a critical factor in determining 
the optimal patent breadth as well as the affect of patent breadth on the rivals’ R&D spending, the 
probability of success by rivals and the timing that success occurs.    
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework 
developed to examine the innovator’s strategic patenting behavior. The main assumptions of the 
model are stated in this section. Section 3 describes the analytical solution of the strategic patent 
breadth model. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.    4
2.  Theoretical Development of the Strategic Patent Breadth Model 
The determination of the optimal patent breadth for a strategically behaving innovator who has 
invented a process innovation and seeks patent protection is modeled as a sequential game of 
complete information. The agents involved in the game are an incumbent/patentee who is a holder 
of a process patent and an entrant who considers entering into the incumbent’s market. It is assumed 
that the process innovation that is generated by the incumbent meets the patentability requirements 
and that the regulator (i.e., Patent Office) always grants the patent as claimed. The regulator is thus 
not explicitly modeled. The model considers the determination of the optimal patent breadth when 
the innovator has no guidance from the Patent Office in structuring his claims; a realistic 
assumption for drastic innovations.  
  The game consists of two periods, period one, which takes place over the time interval TG-
−T0, and period two, which takes place over the time interval T0−∞. The expression TG denotes the 
time that the patent is granted and the expression T0 (T0=0) the time that the incumbent markets the 
new product and the entrant enters the market. During the first period of the game, the incumbent, 
having developed a process innovation and having decided to seek patent protection, determines the 
breadth, b, of patent protection claimed. During this period the validity of the patent may be directly 
challenged. The outcome of the challenge determines whether the validity of the patent is upheld or 
not. If the validity challenge is successful and the patent is revoked, the entrant enters the market at 
time T0 using the incumbent’s process and the entrant and the incumbent choose their respective 
output levels and compete in the market. If the patent validity is not challenged or if it is challenged 
and the challenge is unsuccessful (i.e., the patent is found to be valid), then the entrant, starting at 
time T0, determines the flow of R&D spending, x, that will enable her to generate a non-infringing 
process. The incumbent operates as a monopolist for as long as the entrant is not successful in 
generating the non-infringing process. Once the entrant succeeds in generating the non-infringing 
process, however, the incumbent and the entrant choose their respective output levels and compete 
in the market.   
  The single entrant assumption is made to simplify the analysis. The assumption implies that 
either there is a minimum efficient scale requirement in this industry or that large sunk costs not 
linked to the R&D process need to be incurred upon entry that prevent the market from becoming 
competitive even when the incumbent’s patent is revoked. Thus, the sunk costs that need to be 
incurred by the players upon entry are exogenous (the level of the sunk costs is not affected by the   5
players’ decisions, e.g., regulatory costs) and their level is such that  0 ) 2 ( ≥ Π = n  while  0 ) 3 ( < Π = n  (n 
denotes the number of players). 
  The incumbent’s decision to invest in R&D and patent his product is not considered in this 
game. The above decisions are treated as exogenous. The only decision the incumbent makes is to 
determine the breadth of patent protection for his process. The length of patent protection is 
assumed to be fixed and for simplicity it is also assumed to be infinite. Thus, the patent will stay 
active unless it is invalidated during a patent validity challenge and is thus revoked. It is also 
assumed that the incumbent’s patent does not infringe on any previous product or process patent 
and there is only one Patent Office where the incumbent can apply for patent protection. Time is 
modeled as being continuous and complete and perfect information are assumed. The incumbent 
acts strategically taking into consideration the entrant’s response to different patent breadth choices 
when he determines the breadth of patent protection claimed.  
  A summary of the formal strategic patent breadth determination game is depicted 
diagrammatically in Figure 1. In period one the incumbent determines the breadth of patent 
protection claimed, b, and he is granted a process patent. The patent is then challenged by a third 
party with probability δ and during the challenge process the viability of the patent is determined. 
The patent is upheld with probability µ and it is revoked with probability 1-µ. The upholding or 
revoking of the patent marks the end of period one. In period two the product is marketed by the 
incumbent. If the validity of the patent is not challenged or if it is challenged and upheld, then at the 
beginning of period two the entrant chooses the optimal flow of R&D spending, x. The incumbent 
operates as a monopolist for as long as the entrant is not successful in generating her own non-
infringing process. Once the entrant succeeds, however, the incumbent and the entrant choose their 
respective output levels and they each earn duopoly profits. The payoffs for the incumbent and the 
entrant when the patent is challenged and upheld are given by 
C
U I E ) (Π  and 
C
U E E ) (Π , respectively 
(see payoffs at A). If the patent is not challenged, the payoffs are given by 
NC
I E ) (Π  and 
NC
E E ) (Π , 
respectively (see payoffs at C). If the patent is revoked after it has been challenged, then starting at 
the beginning of period two the entrant produces the new non-patentable product using the 
incumbent’s process and the incumbent and the entrant receive payoffs 
C
R I E ) (Π  and 
C
R E) (Π , 
respectively (see payoffs at B).    
   6
 
 
Figure 1  The Strategic Patent Breadth Game 
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  In this model the entrant knows (with certainty) the outcome of the patent challenge when 
she decides on the level of R&D expenses to be incurred or when she decides on whether to enter 
the market using the incumbent’s process. The incumbent on the other hand knows only the 
probability with which his patent will be challenged and the probability with which his patent will 
be upheld when challenged when he determines the breadth of patent protection claimed.   
 
  The Process Innovation Space, Patent Breadth and the R&D Process 
It is assumed that the patentable process is used for the production of a new non-patentable product 
(e.g., the t-PA drug in U.K.). The potential entrant is thus free to produce the new product by 
generating her own non-infringing process. This model assumes that if the entrant enters the market 
she will do so without infringing the incumbent’s process. In addition, if the entrant is successful in 
generating her own process, she does not have to patent it since further entry is not anticipated.  
  The model assumes that the patented process results in zero per unit production costs and 
that if the entrant succeeds in generating her own non-infringing process, her process will be 
equally efficient (i.e., the entrant’s process also results in per unit production costs of zero). Thus, 
the model is not a quality ladder model where one innovator supersedes the other in producing a 
better innovation. Both the incumbent/patentee and the potential entrant use their processes to 
produce the new non-patentable product, which is viewed by the consumers as a homogeneous 
product. In other words, consumers are indifferent as to whether the new product was made with the 
incumbent’s or the entrant’s process. 
  It is also assumed that there are no close substitutes for the new product. The above 
assumption implies that the incumbent will make monopoly profits for as long as the entrant fails to 
generate a non-infringing process. Once the entrant succeeds in generating her own non-infringing 
process, the incumbent and the entrant will share the market, each making duopoly profits. 
  The process innovation space and the breadth of patent protection are depicted in Figure 2. 
The line of unit length represents the process innovation space. Each point within this space 
represents a process that is capable of producing the product in question at the same production 
cost. Thus, different points on the unit length line refer to the different processes that can be used to 
produce the non-patentable product at a per unit cost of zero. The closer are two points in the 
process innovation space, the more similar are the processes in terms of the way they work in 
generating the given product.   8
 
Figure 2  The Process Innovation Space and the Breadth of Patent Protection  
  Point A in Figure 2 refers to the patented process generated by the incumbent.  Patent 
breadth refers to the area on the unit length line around point A which is protected by the patent. 
Patent breadth includes all the processes that, if they were developed by competitors, would infringe 
the patent. Patent breadth takes values in the interval b∈(0,1]. A patent breadth value close to zero 
(b→0) implies that the patent protects only against duplication of the patented process. On the other 
hand, a patent breadth value equal to one (b=1) implies that there is no other process that can be 
used to produce the non-patentable product without infringing the patent. It is assumed that patent 
breadth defines an exact border of protection (i.e., fencepost patent system).  
  To simplify the model it is assumed that it is a third party and not the potential entrant who 
directly challenges the validity of the patent.
1 Thus, in this model, the entrant benefits from the 
validity challenge without incurring the opposition costs. The costs incurred by the incumbent 
during a validity challenge are denoted by CT and are assumed to be independent of the breadth of 
patent protection. In addition, it is assumed that the incumbent’s opposition costs do not affect the 
probability that the patent will be challenged and the probability that the validity of the patent will 
be upheld.  
  The probability that the validity of the patent will be directly challenged is denoted by δ and 
it is a function of patent breadth. Recent empirical studies have found a positive relationship 
between the breadth of the patent, measured by the number of claims made, and the probability of 
validity challenges (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001). In addition, Lentz (1988) and Merges and 
Nelson (1990) observe that the greater is the breadth of patent protection, the greater is the 
probability that the validity of the patent will be challenged. Following the above studies, this model 
assumes a positive relationship between patent breadth and the probability that the validity of the 
patent will be challenged. For simplicity, it is further assumed that when the maximum patent 
                                                 
1 Third parties are allowed to challenge the validity of patents in the Patent Office without having to prove any special 
interest for doing so. Harhoff and Reitzig (2000) state that various interest groups are trying to influence the European 
patenting practice by filing opposition cases especially against biotechnology patents.  





breadth is claimed (bmax=1), the validity of the patent is always challenged. These assumptions are 
captured by assuming that the probability that the validity of the patent will be directly challenged, 
δ, is equal to  b = δ . 
  The patent may not always be found valid during the patent validity challenge. There is a 
probability, denoted by µ, that the validity of the patent will be upheld during the validity challenge, 
where µ is given by  b − =1 µ . Thus, the greater is the breadth of patent protection, the smaller is 
the probability that the validity of the patent will be upheld. The above assumption is justified by 
the fact that the greater is patent breadth, the harder it is to show novelty, nonobviousness and 
enablement (Cornish 1989). In addition, empirical evidence suggests that courts tend to uphold 
narrow patents and revoke broad ones (Merges and Nelson 1990, Waterson 1990). Thus, when 
patent breadth takes its maximum value (bmax=1), the patent is always found to be invalid (µ=0). 
  In statistical terms, the event that the patent will be challenged and the event that the validity 
of the patent will be upheld are treated as independent.
2 This assumption is valid given that the 
patent validity challenger is not the one who rules on whether the patent is valid. There is no 
evidence in the literature to suggest that there is a relationship between the probability that the 
patent will be challenged and the way the courts and/or the Patent Office rule on patent validity 
issues.    
  When the validity of the patent is not challenged, or when it is challenged and upheld, the 
entrant must invest in R&D to generate her own non-infringing process to produce the non-
patentable product, if she wants to enter the market. To capture the uncertainty associated with the 
R&D process it is assumed that the innovation process is stochastic. Innovation in this model occurs 
according to the Poisson process. The research technology is ‘memoryless’; that is, the probability 
that the entrant will succeed in generating an innovation at any given point in time depends only on 
the current R&D expenditure, not on past R&D experience (Tirole 1988). This is a common 
assumption in the R&D literature and is made to simplify the analysis (Loury 1979, Lee and Wild 
1980). The instantaneous probability of success is denoted by λ and is constant. The parameter λ 
shows that if the entrant has not succeeded by time τ in generating a non-infringing process then the 
probability of succeeding at the next instant, that is at  dt + τ , is  dt λ . The elapsed time, τ, before an 
innovation arrives has a probability density function described by the exponential 
                                                 
2 This assumption implies that the probability that the patent will be upheld given that is has been challenged is equal to 
the probability that the patent will be upheld, i.e., prob[µδ]=prob[µ].    10
distribution
λτ λ τ
− = e f ) ( f o r  λ>0 and 0≤τ≤∞ and a cumulative probability function 
λτ τ
− − = e F 1 ) ( . The cumulative distribution gives the probability that success will occur by time τ 
(i.e.,  ] [ ) ( τ τ ≤ = t prob F ).  
  In this model it is assumed that the instantaneous probability of success λ is a function of the 
entrant’s R&D spending per unit of time, denoted by x, and the breadth of patent protection b, 
) , ( b x f = λ . The flow rate of R&D spending, x, is assumed to be constant and it is incurred by the 
entrant for as long as it takes to realize a success. Following standard economic theory assumptions, 
it is assumed that the R&D spending per unit of time increases the probability of success at a 
decreasing rate; λx>0, λxx<0 and also  0 =
∞ → x ximλ l  and λx(0)→∞ (Loury 1979, Reinganum 1983).  
  The instantaneous probability of success λ is also a function of the breadth of patent 
protection since in this model success implies that the entrant will only be able to enter with a non-
infringing process. That is, the entrant must generate a process outside the technological territory − 
i.e., the patent breadth − claimed by the incumbent. Given that the entrant has not already 
succeeded, it is assumed that the greater is the patent breadth, the smaller is the probability that the 
entrant will succeed at the next instant, in generating a non-infringing process for producing the 
new non-patentable product. It is thus assumed that the breadth of patent protection decreases the 
probability of success at an increasing rate; λb<0, λbb>0. The justification for this assumption is that 
since the entrant will enter with a non-infringing process, the greater is patent breadth the more 
dissimilar will be the two processes − the further away from the patentee’s process the entrant’s 
process will be in the process innovation space in Figure 2. This, in turn, implies that the greater is 
patent breadth, the less useful is the information disclosed by the patent for the entrant and thus the 
more difficult it becomes for the entrant to generate her non-infringing process.  
  To completely describe the instantaneous probability of success, λ, the instantaneous 
probability of success is assumed to be either additively or multiplicatively separable in the flow of 
R&D spending and in patent breadth, i.e.,   ) ( ) ( b x ψ ϕ λ + =  or  ) ( ) ( b x ψ ϕ λ ⋅ = . The functions  ) (x ϕ  
and  ) (b ψ  satisfy all theoretical assumptions concerning the instantaneous probability of success, 
that is,  0 > x ϕ , 0 < xx ϕ , 0 < b ψ  and  0 > bb ψ . With the additively separable formulation, the 
marginal effect of R&D spending on the probability of success is independent of the breadth of the 
patent, 0 = xb λ . With the multiplicatively separable formulation the marginal effect of R&D   11
spending on the probability of success is inversely related to the breadth of the patent,  0 < xb λ  (see 
Proposition 2 for a formal proof).  
  Given the above, when  ) ( ) ( b x ψ ϕ λ + =  the incumbent’s patent breadth choice affects the 
entrant’s probability of success, λ, only directly ( 0 < b λ ). When  ) ( ) ( b x ψ ϕ λ ⋅ =  the incumbent’s 
patent breadth choice affects the entrant’s probability of success, λ, both directly ( 0 < b λ ) and 
indirectly ( 0 < xb λ ). In this case, as patent breadth increases, the harder it becomes to generate a 
non-infringing process (i.e., direct effect) and the less effective R&D spending becomes in 
increasing the probability of success (i.e., indirect effect). An additively separable function and a 
multiplicatively separable function that satisfy all theoretical assumptions regarding the 
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λ = : 2  respectively, 
where θ ∈(0,1].    
    
3.  The Analytical Solution of the Strategic Patent Breadth Game 
Given the assumption of complete and perfect information, the incumbent knows when he 
determines the breadth of patent protection claimed how patent breadth affects the probability that 
the patent will be challenged, δ, the probability that the validity of the patent will be upheld after 
challenge, µ, and the entrant’s probability of succeeding at any given instant in generating a non-
infringing process, λ. The incumbent chooses the breadth of patent protection that will induce the 
desired behavior from the entrant and will allow him to maximize the rents that he can appropriate 
from his innovation.  
  The optimal breadth of patent protection for the innovator is determined using backwards 
induction. The duopoly profits that are realized at the second period of the game when both the 
incumbent and the entrant operate in the market are determined first. The entrant’s decision of the 
optimal R&D spending is determined next and the incumbent’s optimal patent breadth choice is 
determined last. 
  Determination of the Duopoly Profits 
During the second period of the game (T0−∞) both the incumbent and the entrant produce the 
product when either the entrant succeeds in generating the non-infringing process or when the   12
patent is revoked after being challenged. Since production costs have been assumed to be zero, both 
players will produce the same output and will earn the same rate of instantaneous profits. These 
instant profits are given by  0 > Π = Π = Π d E I .
3 Although the entrant earns the same level of 
instantaneous profits the discounted profits will differ from those of the incumbent depending on 
the R&D expenditures and on the exogenous sunk costs she has to incur.  
  The Entrant’s Optimal R&D Spending Decision 
Two cases emerge regarding the entrant’s behavior depending on whether the patent is challenged 
and revoked or on whether the patent is not challenged or is challenged and upheld. The entrant’s 
optimal decision when the patent is challenged and revoked is examined first. 
  The Patent is Challenged and Revoked  
The entrant does not have to make an investment decision if the patent is revoked after being 
challenged. Since generating a new process is costly for the entrant (i.e., positive R&D costs are 
required), the entrant simply uses the incumbent’s process to produce the new product. When the 














) (        ( 1 )  
where r is the discount rate and F are the exogenous sunk costs incurred by the entrant at time zero 
(T0). 






⇒ > Π 0 ) ( .  
  The Patent is Not Challenged or is Challenged and Upheld  
When the patent is not challenged, or is challenged and upheld, the entrant must decide on the flow 
of R&D spending that will enable her to generate the non-infringing process that will be used for 
the production of the new product. The entrant chooses the flow of R&D spending, x, that 
                                                 
3 Given that the incumbent and the entrant compete in quantities and not in prices and that the unit production costs are 
zero the duopoly profits that they realize are positive.     13
maximizes the present value of her expected profits. Note that the entrant’s expected profits are the 
same irrespective of whether the patent is not challenged or challenged and upheld 
(
C
U E E ) (Π =
NC
E E ) (Π ) since it is not the entrant but a third party that challenges the validity of the 
patent. The entrant’s objective function is given by: 
  F dt x b x e e E E d
t b x rt
E E x
NC C
U − − Π = Π = Π
−
∞




λ    (2) 
Equation (2) shows that if the entrant has not succeeded before time t in generating the non-
infringing process, she then receives  d Π  if she succeeds at time t. This event has probability 
density 
t b x e b x
) , ( ) , (
λ λ
− . The entrant pays R&D costs of x so long as no success has occurred. This 
event has probability 
t b x e
) , ( λ − . Finally, the entrant pays costs F at time zero irrespective of whether 
she succeeds in generating the process.  
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     (3)   
  The entrant chooses the flow of R&D spending that maximizes her objective function given 
in equation (3). Optimization of equation (3) yields the following first order conditions (F.O.C.) for 
a maximum: 
  ) , , ( 0
) , (
0
) ( ) ( *
d d
x



















  The F.O.C. yield the optimal flow of R&D spending expressed in terms of known 
parameters; the breadth of patent protection, the duopoly profits and the discount rate. The F.O.C. 
implicitly define the entrant’s best response function, which shows how the entrant responds to 
different patent breadth choices.  
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0 ) ( ) (       ( 5 )  
  The second order conditions (S.O.C.) imply that for a maximum the condition given in 
equation (6) must be satisfied.    14
  x x x x h g h g < ⇒ < − 0            ( 6 )  
Equation (6) shows that at the optimum the slope of  ) (x h  must be greater than the slope of  ) (x g ; 
) (x h  must cut  ) (x g  from below at the optimum. Given that  0 1> = x g  equation (6) implies that 
) (x h  must be increasing in x and also that  1 > x h .  It is easily verified that both the above 




























, since  0 < xx λ . The S.O.C. are satisfied for both the 
additive and the multiplicative formulations of the instantaneous probability of success, λ. Also, 
d r h Π − = ) 0 (  since λx(0)→∞ which holds due to the theoretical properties of the instantaneous 
probability of success.  
  The slope of  ) (x h  is decreasing in the flow of R&D spending, x, for both the additive and 
the multiplicative formulations of the instantaneous probability of success, λ, that is, 
0
) (




















λ λ λ λ
. A formal proof is presented in the Appendix. Note 
that the determination of the curvature of  ) (x h  is not important for the results, it is necessary only 
for the graphical representation of the optimum. Figure 3 depicts the graphical representation of the 
determination of the optimal flow of R&D spending. 
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  The entrant’s expected profits when the patent is not challenged or when it is challenged and 
upheld are obtained by substituting the optimal flow of R&D spending into the entrant’s expected 
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      ( 7 )  
The entrant will enter the market only if she realizes positive profits, that is, if 
0 ) ( ) ( > Π = Π
NC C
U E E E E . This condition can be expressed as: 
  
) , (



















> Π ⇒ > −
+
− Π
    (8)   
  Note that the entry condition in equation (8) is determined by the level of duopoly profits, 
the discount rate, the exogenous sunk costs and the incumbent’s patent breadth decision. Equation 
(8) opens the possibility that a patent breadth value  ] 1 , 0 ( ˆ∈ b  may exist such that the entry condition 
is not satisfied. If b ˆ exists and it is chosen by the incumbent, then the entrant will not enter the 
market. 
  When entry is not deterred the entrant’s optimal flow of R&D spending is given by equation 
(4). This equation can be used to determine the effect of a change in the breadth of patent 
protection, the level of duopoly profits and the discount rate, on the optimal flow of R&D spending.  









 is derived by totally differentiating the 









) ( ) (  (i.e., equation (5)), with respect to the optimal 
flow of R&D spending, x
*, and patent breadth, b. The result of this differentiation is: 
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λ λ λ λ + −
= .    16
  The nature of the instantaneous probability of success, λ, must be specified before the 
relationship between the optimal level of R&D spending, x
*, and patent breadth, b, can be 
determined. This is so because the term  b h  depends on the term  xb λ , the sign of which depends on 
whether the instantaneous probability of success, λ, is additively or multiplicatively separable in the 
flow of R&D spending, x, and in patent breadth, b.  
Proposition 1 When the instantaneous probability of success, λ, is additively separable in patent 
breadth, b, and in the flow of R&D spending, x, (i.e.,  ) ( ) ( b x ψ ϕ λ + = ), the effect of a change in 
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Proof:  

















λ λ λ λ + −
= <0. The slope of the best response function, given by equation (9), is thus 






  The above result suggests that as patent breadth increases so does the flow of R&D 
spending. The intuition behind this result is as follows. The entrant responds to an increase in patent 
breadth with an increase in her flow of R&D spending trying to counterbalance the negative effect 
that the increase in patent breadth has on the probability of success. 
Proposition 2 When the instantaneous probability of success, λ, is multiplicatively separable in the 
patent breadth, b, and in the flow of R&D spending, x, (i.e.,  ) ( ) ( b x ψ ϕ λ ⋅ = ) the effect of a change 





.   
Proof:  


























. Thus, patent breadth affects the probability of success both directly   17













λ λ λ λ
. Given that 







=  (from equation 9) and 






The intuition behind the result presented in Proposition 2 is as follows. An increase in patent 
breadth has two effects on the entrant. First, she knows that a change in b means she will have to 
spend more to be able to succeed (to counterbalance the negative effect that an increase in the patent 
breadth has on the probability of success). Second, she also knows that the effect of the additional 
R&D spending on the probability of success will now be smaller (due to  0 < xb λ ). Since an increase 
in patent breadth makes investment less efficient and more costly for the entrant, the entrant 
responds with a reduction in the optimal flow of R&D spending.  
Having determined how patent breadth affects the flow of R&D spending under different 
assumptions about the relationship between the flow of R&D spending and patent breadth (i.e., 
0 = xb λ  and  0 < xb λ ), the effect of a change in patent breadth on the total expected R&D costs that 
the entrant must incur before a success is realized can be determined. The total expected R&D costs 
to be incurred by the entrant are given by:  
  x
b x
x TEC e E ) , (
1
λ
τ = =         ( 1 0 )  





τ =  denotes the average elapsed time before success is realized; 
this is the mean of the exponential distribution
λτ λ τ
− = e f ) ( . The average elapsed time before 
success occurs is decreasing in the flow of the R&D spending,  0
1

















increasing in the breadth of patent protection,  0
1
















. Thus, on the one hand, 
the greater is the flow of R&D spending, the greater is the probability that success will be realized 
the next instant, and the shorter is the time that elapses before success occurs. On the other hand, the 
greater is patent breadth, the smaller is the probability that success will occur the next instant and 
thus the longer is the period that elapses before success occurs. The propositions that follow 
describe the relationship between patent breadth and the total expected R&D costs when the   18
instantaneous probability of success is additively and multiplicatively separable in the flow of R&D 
spending and in patent breadth.  
Proposition 3 The total expected R&D costs are increasing in patent breadth,  0 >
db
dTECE , when 
the instantaneous probability of success, λ, is additively separable in patent breadth, b, and in the 
flow of R&D spending, x.    
Proof:  

















e E  since  0 > b x  as shown in 
Proposition 1 and 0 < b λ . □ 
  The intuition behind the result presented in Proposition 3 is as follows. When the 
instantaneous probability of success is additively separable in the flow of R&D spending and in 
patent breadth, patent breadth affects the expected total R&D costs in two ways. First, a higher 





), and second, greater 
patent breadth increases the flow of R&D spending ( 0 > b x ). Both outcomes imply that the 
expected total R&D costs to be incurred by the entrant are rising in b. 
Proposition 4 The effect of an increase in patent breadth on the total expected R&D costs when the 
instantaneous probability of success, λ, is multiplicatively separable in patent breadth, b, and in the 
flow of R&D spending, x, depends on whether an increase in patent breadth increases the elapsed 
time before success is realized more than it decreases the flow of R&D spending. 
Proof:  
















. When  ) ( ) ( b x ψ ϕ λ ⋅ =  then  0 < b x  as shown in Proposition 2 
and 0 < b λ . Given the above, the sign of 
db






 and  b ex τ , which are positive and negative respectively (or equivalently the terms  λ b x  and   19





 then  0 <
db








dTECE . □ 
  When the instantaneous probability of success is multiplicatively separable in the flow of 
R&D spending and in patent breadth, patent breadth affects the expected total R&D costs in two 
countervailing ways. On the one hand, an increase in patent breadth increases the elapsed time 
before success is realized; on the other hand, an increase in patent breadth decreases the flow of 
R&D spending. When  0 >
db
dTECE  then even though the amount spend on R&D per unit of time 
decreases as patent breadth increases this amount is now spread over a longer period making the 
total effect of the increase in patent breadth positive. When  0 <
db
dTECE  then even though the 
period over which the flow R&D costs are incurred increases as patent breadth increases, the 
decrease in the flow of R&D spending (caused by the patent breadth increase) is greater in absolute 
terms making the total effect of an increase in patent breadth on the total expected R&D costs 
negative.  
The effect of a change in the anticipated level of duopoly profits on the flow of the R&D 










) ( ) ( , with respect to the optimal flow of R&D spending, x
* and the 





 is given by: 
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    (11) 
Proposition 5 The optimal level of the flow of R&D spending is increasing in the duopoly profits 






, for both the additive and the multiplicative formulations of the instantaneous probability 
of success, λ.    
Proof:  
 From the S.O.C.,  0 < − x x h g . Also,  0 = Πd g  and  0 < − = Π r h






Thus, as it would be expected, the entrant reacts to an increase in the anticipated duopoly profits by 
increasing the optimal flow of R&D spending. □ 
Proposition 6 The total expected R&D costs that are incurred by the entrant before a success 
occurs are increasing in the duopoly profits that the entrant anticipates to make if she succeeds in 





.    
Proof: 
The change in the total expected R&D costs that follows a change in the anticipated duopoly profits 



































. In this expression the term 









) (  is positive as shown in Proposition 5. The term 
2 λ
λ λ x x −
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λ = : 2 , respectively, are used. When λ is described by f1 then 
θ θ λ










1 1 1  which holds ∀b∈(0,1], x≥0 since θ∈(0,1). When λ is 














x  which holds true ∀b∈(0,1], x≥0 since θ∈(0,1). 
□ 
  The intuition behind the result presented in Proposition 6 is as follows. The increase in the 
anticipated duopoly profits causes the entrant to increase her flow of spending in R&D (see 
Proposition 5). The increase in the flow of R&D spending affects the expected total R&D costs in   21
two countervailing ways. A greater flow of R&D spending directly obviously increases the 
expected total costs. It also indirectly decreases the expected total R&D costs by decreasing the 





). However, the positive direct effect is 
stronger than the negative indirect effect. The result is that an increase in the anticipated duopoly 
profits on the expected total R&D costs is positive.  
  The effect of a change in the discount rate on the optimal level of R&D spending is derived 









) ( ) ( , with respect to 
the optimal flow of R&D spending, x
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     ( 1 2 )  
From the S.O.C. it is known that  0 < − x x h g . Also,  0 = r g . The sign of the term  d
x




cannot be determined, however, without knowledge of the magnitude of the parameters in the 
expression. For instance, note that the impact of the discount rate on the optimal level of R&D 





 then an 









 an increase in the discount rate results in an increase in the optimal level of the flow 
of R&D spending  0 >
dr
dx





 a change in the discount rate causes no change 
in the optimal level of R&D spending. Given that the effect of a change in the discount rate on the 
optimal level of the flow of R&D spending is inconclusive, the effect of a change in the discount 
rate on the expected total R&D costs is also inconclusive.    22
  The Incumbent’s Optimal Patent Breadth Decision 
Given the assumption of complete information, the incumbent knows how patent breadth affects the 
entrant’s optimal R&D spending decision. The incumbent can then choose the breadth of patent 
protection that induces the desired behavior from the entrant. This is the breadth of patent protection 
that maximizes the incumbent’s discounted expected returns.  
  The incumbent’s expected returns are a function of his expected returns when the patent is 
not challenged, 
NC
I E ) (Π , and the expected returns when the patent is challenged, 
C
I E ) (Π . Since 
the incumbent’s patent is challenged with probability δ and it is not challenged with probability 1-δ, 
the incumbent’s discounted expected profits are given by equation (13).  
 
NC C
I I I E E E ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( Π − + Π = Π δ δ        ( 1 3 )  
  The incumbent’s expected returns when the patent is challenged are a function of the 
incumbent’s expected returns when the patent is challenged and upheld, 
C
U I E ) (Π , and the expected 
returns when the patent is challenged and revoked, 
C
R I E ) (Π . Given that the patent is challenged and 
upheld with probability µ and it is challenged and revoked with probability 1-µ, the incumbent’s 
expected returns when the patent is challenged are given by equation (14). In equation (14)  T C  
denotes the legal costs incurred by the incumbent during the patent challenge process. 
T R I I I C E E E
C C
U
C − Π − + Π = Π ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( µ µ       ( 1 4 )  
  The incumbent’s expected returns when his patent is not challenged or when it is challenged 
and upheld are the same (
NC
I E ) (Π =
C
U I E ) (Π ) because in both cases the incumbent operates as a 
monopolist until the entrant succeeds in generating a non-infringing process. Once the entrant 
succeeds, the incumbent shares the market with the entrant, each making duopoly profits. The 
incumbent’s discounted expected profits when his patent is not challenged or when it is challenged 
and upheld are given by equation (15). 
u d m
d m
t b x rt
I I r
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  Equation (15) shows that the incumbent receives monopoly profits  m Π  at t if by time t the 
entrant has not yet succeeded in generating a non-infringing process. This event has probability 
t b x e
) , ( * λ − . The incumbent receives duopoly profits  d Π  at time t if, at t, the entrant succeeds in 
generating a non-infringing process. This event has a probability density function 
t b x e b x
) , ( * *
) , (
λ λ
− .   23
When the patent is challenged and revoked, the entrant enters using the incumbent’s process 
and the incumbent shares the market with the entrant making duopoly profits. The incumbent’s 













) (        ( 1 6 )  
  It is assumed that the profits that the incumbent makes when his patent is not challenged or 
is challenged and upheld (
u Π ) are greater than the profits that he makes when his patent is 
challenged and revoked (
R Π ), that is, 
R u Π > Π . This assumption guarantees that the incumbent is 
not indifferent between receiving and not receiving patent protection for his process; the incumbent 
is better off when he receives patent protection.   
  Substitution of equations (15) and (16) into equation (14) yields the expression for the 




C − Π − + Π = Π ) 1 ( ) ( µ µ        ( 1 7 )  
Substitution of equations (15) and (17) into equation (13) yields the expression for the incumbent’s 
discounted profits when entry is not deterred. Recall that the probability of the patent being 









bC b b C
C E
ND
− Π + Π − = − Π −
+ Π − + = Π − + − Π − + Π = Π
2 2) 1 ( ) (
) 1 ( ) 1 ( } ) 1 ( { ) (
δ δµ δ
δ δµ δ µ µ δ
             (18)    
  The analysis so far has proceeded assuming that the entrant will always find it optimal to 
enter the market. It has been shown that the incumbent cannot deter entry when the patent is 
challenged and revoked since in this case the entrant’s profits upon entry do not depend on the 
incumbent’s patent breadth (see equation 1). Recall that the exogenous sunk costs (F) were assumed 
to be such as to allow a duopolistic market structure. It has also been shown that when the patent is 
not challenged, or is challenged and upheld, there may exist a patent breadth value  ] 1 , 0 ( ˆ∈ b  such 
that the entry condition is not satisfied, that is, 
) ˆ ), , , ˆ ( (
)) ˆ ), , , ˆ ( ( ( ) , , ˆ (
*
* *
b r b x









. If b ˆ  
exists and it is chosen by the incumbent, the entrant will not enter when the patent is not challenged 
or is challenged and upheld and the incumbent will make monopoly profits. The incumbent’s profits 
when the patent is not challenged or is challenged and upheld and the incumbent chooses patent 















) ( ) (        ( 1 9 )  
The incumbent’s discounted expected profits when patent breadth b ˆ that deters entry is chosen are 
given by substituting equations (14), (19) and (16) into equation (13). The incumbent’s discounted 
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− + − Π − +
Π
= Π δ µ µ δ
    (20) 
  It should be noted that if a b ˆ that deters entry exists it will be chosen by the incumbent if 
and only if the incumbent’s expected discounted profits when b ˆ is chosen are greater than or equal 
to his profits when entry is not deterred, 
ND D
I I E E ) ( ) ( Π ≥ Π . Thus, it may not always be optimal 
for the incumbent to deter entry in this model. To keep the model simple, the analysis proceeds 
assuming that either there is no patent breadth b ˆ  that can deter entry or that if a patent breadth b ˆ 
exists, it is not optimal for the incumbent to deter entry because b ˆ does not satisfy the condition 
ND D
I I E E ) ( ) ( Π ≥ Π .  
  Given the assumption that entry will not be deterred the incumbent chooses the patent 
breadth that maximizes the expected discounted profits given by equation (18). His objective 




b bC b b E
ND − Π + Π − = Π
2 2) 1 ( ) ( max       ( 2 1 )  
Optimization of equation (21) yields the F.O.C. for a maximum. The F.O.C. are given by equation 
(22).  
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⇒ = − Π +
∂
Π ∂
− + Π − ⇒ =
∂
Π ∂
   (22) 
The F.O.C. for the incumbent’s optimization problem yield the optimal choice of patent breadth as a 
function of known parameters; the monopoly profits, the duopoly profits, the legal costs of the 
challenge process and the discount rate.  
  The interpretation of the F.O.C. given in equation (22) requires the determination of the sign 










 shows how the expected profits made by the incumbent when his   25
patent is not challenged or when it is challenged and upheld are affected by the breadth of patent 
protection. The affect of patent breadth on 
u Π  does not depend on the nature of the instantaneous 
probability of success, as shown in the next proposition.  
Proposition 7 The expected profits made by the incumbent when his patent is not challenged or 





) for both the additive 
and the multiplicative formulations of the instantaneous probability of success, λ.     
Proof: 





 when the instantaneous probability of success is 
multiplicatively separable in the flow of R&D spending and in the patent breadth. In this case, an 
increase in patent breadth leads to a decrease in the flow of R&D spending,  0 < b x  (see Proposition 

















m d b x b
u
, where the term ( m d r Π − Π ) is 
negative as duopoly profits are always smaller than monopoly profits and where  0 < b λ  and  0 > x λ  
from the theoretical assumptions made about the instantaneous probability of success. The above 





. When the instantaneous probability of success is additively 
separable in the flow of R&D spending and in the patent breadth, an increase in patent breadth leads 
to an increase in the flow of R&D spending,  0 > b x  (see Proposition 1). In this case, given that 





 depends on the sign of the expression 
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 is given by 
2 )) ( 1 (











which is greater than zero ∀θ∈(0,1), b∈(0,1], x≥0 and r∈[0,1]. □ 
  The intuition behind the result presented in Proposition 7 is as follows. When the 
instantaneous probability of success is multiplicatively separable in the flow of R&D spending and 
in the patent breadth, an increase in patent breadth affects the instantaneous probability of success   26
both directly ( 0 < b λ ) and indirectly ( 0 < xb λ ). Since the entrant responds to an increase in patent 
breadth with a decrease in the flow of R&D spending ( 0 < b x ), it becomes more difficult for the 
entrant to succeed in generating the non-infringing process. The more difficult it is for the entrant to 
succeed, the longer the incumbent can operate as a monopolist and the greater are his expected 
profits (
u Π ). When the instantaneous probability of success is additively separable in the flow of 
R&D spending and in the patent breadth, an increase in patent breadth affects the instantaneous 
probability of success only directly ( 0 < b λ  and  0 = xb λ ). In addition, the entrant responds to an 
increase in patent breadth with an increase in the flow of R&D spending ( 0 > b x ). The increase in 
the flow of the R&D spending, in turn, has a positive affect on the instantaneous probability of 
success ( 0 > x λ ). The total effect of an increase in patent breadth on the incumbent’s expected 
profits (
u Π ) is positive because the decrease in the probability of success caused by an increase in 
patent breadth is greater than the increase in the probability of success caused by the increase in the 
flow of R&D spending (i.e.,  x b λ λ > ).  
  Having determined how patent breadth affects the incumbent’s expected profits when his 





), the F.O.C. can be interpreted. 
The F.O.C. demonstrate the trade off that the incumbent faces when he determines the optimal 
breadth of patent protection. An increase in patent breadth leads to an increase in the incumbent’s 








− 2 ) 1 (
2 ; this increase represents the marginal benefit to the 
incumbent from an increase in patent breadth. At the same time, an increase in patent breadth leads 
to a decrease in the incumbent’s expected returns by  T
u C b + Π 2 ; this decrease represents the 
marginal cost to the incumbent from an increase in patent breadth. Given that as patent breadth 
increases so does the probability that the patent will be challenged and revoked, by increasing 
patent breadth the incumbent increases the likelihood that he will realize profits 
R Π  (i.e., profits 
earned when the patent is revoked) rather than 
u Π  (i.e., profits earned when the patent is not 
challenged or is challenged and upheld). In addition, by increasing patent breadth the incumbent 






) but, at the same time, he increases the probability that the patent will be challenged and   27
that he will have to incur the legal costs CT. At the optimal patent breadth the marginal benefits will 
be equal to the marginal costs.  
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b b b k b f = Π +
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Π ∂
− + Π − ⇒ = − 2 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( 0 ) ( ) (
2     (23) 
The S.O.C. for a maximum imply that the following inequality must be satisfied
  b b b b k f k f < ⇒ < − 0        ( 2 4 )  
Given that the  0 = b k , the S.O.C. imply that  0 < b f  which means that  b f  must cut  b k  from above 








0 2 2 ) 1 ( < Π + Π − = =
R u b f . To guarantee the existence of an optimum the increase in the 






should be greater than the legal costs incurred by the incumbent when the patent is challenged,  T C . 





> T C  guarantees that  b f  cuts  b k  from above.  
Proposition 8 Claiming the maximum breadth of patent protection (i.e., b
*=1) is never an optimal 
strategy for the incumbent in this model.     
Proof:  
At b=1  0 ) 1 ( ≥ = = T C b k  and  0 ) ( 2 ) 1 ( < Π + Π − = =
R u b f . The above imply that the curves  ) (b k  
and ) (b f  will never cross at b=1. The same result is of course derived when the marginal benefits 
and the marginal costs are compared for b=1. When b=1 the marginal costs are always greater than 
the marginal benefits, i.e.,  T
u C + Π 2>
R Π 2 . Thus, b=1 is not a profit maximizing patent breadth 
choice for the incumbent in this model. □ 
                                                 
4 Note that the functions  ) (b k  and  ) (b f  are not defined in terms of marginal benefits and marginal costs because the 
slope and the curvature of the marginal benefit curve cannot be determined without knowledge of the values of the 
parameters that affect it. The chosen formulation simplifies the analysis.    28
  The graphical representation of the determination of the optimal patent breadth is depicted in 
Figure 4. In Figure 4 the slope of the curve  ) (b f  has been assumed to be decreasing in patent 
breadth, 0 < bb f .
5  
 
Figure 4   Graphical Representation of the Determination of the Optimal Patent Breadth 
  As shown in equation (22) the optimal patent breadth is a function of the following 
parameters, ) , , , (
* r C b T d m Π Π = . The effect of a change in the parameters of interest on the 




















  The effect of a change in the monopoly profits on the optimal breadth is determined first. 





 is derived by totally differentiating the optimality condition 
                                                 
5 The curvature of f(b) cannot be determined without knowledge of the magnitude of the parameters that affect it. Note 
that the determination of the curvature of f(b) in not important for the results, it is necessary only for the graphical 
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0 2 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( 0 ) ( ) (
2 = − Π +
∂
Π ∂





b b b k b f  with respect to the optimal patent 
breadth, b
*, and the monopoly profits,  m Π :  
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 depends on the sign of the term 
m fΠ . 






), when  ) , 0 (






when  ] 1 , (
* b b ∈ . The patent breadth  ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ b  is the breadth of patent protection that makes the 









The patent breadth b  exists for both the additive and multiplicative formulations of the 
instantaneous probability of success.   
Proof: 




: 1 + =





λ = : 2  are used, 
respectively, to prove Proposition 9. The detailed proof is presented in the Appendix. It is found that 
there exists a patent breadth  ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ b  such that  0 ) ( = Π b f
m  for both  1 f  and  2 f . It is also found that 
m fΠ  is decreasing in patent breadth ∀θ∈(0,1), x≥0 and r∈[0,1]. The above imply that if patent 
breadth b
* is such that  ) , 0 (





 while if patent 
breadth b
* is such that  ] 1 , (





 (see equation (25)). □   30
  The intuition behind the results of Proposition 9 is as follows. There are two countervailing 
effects that take place as patent breadth increases. On the one hand, a larger patent breadth makes it 
harder for the entrant to succeed in generating a non-infringing process, thus allowing the 
incumbent to make monopoly profits for a longer period. On the other hand, the probability that the 
patent will be challenged and the probability that it will be revoked increase, making it less likely 
for the incumbent to realize monopoly profits. There is a critical patent breadth value b  which 
makes the two effects equal. When the breadth of patent protection is smaller than b , the danger of 
having the patent challenged and revoked is relatively small and the incumbent tries to capture the 
(increased) monopoly profits by making it harder for the entrant to succeed. Thus, when b
*<b , an 
increase in the anticipated monopoly profits results in an increase in the optimal breadth of patent 
protection. However, when initially the patent breadth is greater than b , the risk of having the 
patent revoked (due to the large patent breadth) is now relatively large and the incumbent reduces 
the breadth of protection in order to reduce the probability that the patent will be revoked and that 
he will not have a chance to operate as a monopolist. Thus, when initially patent breadth is greater 
than b , the incumbent responds to an increase in the anticipated monopoly profits with a decrease 
in the optimal patent breadth level.  






, is determined by totally differentiating the optimality condition 
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b b b k b f  with respect to the optimal patent 
breadth, b





 is given by equation (26). 
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 depends   31
on the sign of the term 
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] 1 , (
* b b ∈ . The patent breadth  ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ b  is the breadth of patent protection that makes the effect of 








. The patent 
breadth b  exists for both the additive and multiplicative formulations of the instantaneous 
probability of success.   
Proof: 




: 1 + =





λ = : 2   are used, 
respectively, to prove the above proposition. The detailed proof is presented in the Appendix. It is 
found that there exists a patent breadth  ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ b   such that  0 ) (
* = = Π b b f
d  for both  1 f  and  2 f . It 
is also found that the term 





d , ∀θ∈(0,1), x≥0 and 
r∈[0,1]. The above imply that if patent breadth b
* is such that  ) , 0 (
* b b ∈  then  0 < Πd f  which 





 and if patent breadth b
* is such that  ] 1 , (






 (see equation (26)). □ 
  The intuition behind the results of Proposition 10 is as follows. As discussed above two 
countervailing effects take place as patent breadth increases. On the one hand, it becomes harder for 
the entrant to succeed and on the other hand the probability that the patent will be challenged and 
the probability that it will be revoked increase. If the patent breadth is such that  ) , 0 ( b b∈ , then the   32
incumbent responds to an increase in duopoly profits by decreasing patent breadth to make it easier 
for the entrant to succeed and so that he can realize the duopoly profits. If the patent breadth is such 
that  ] 1 , (b b∈ , then the incumbent increases patent breadth to make it easier for his patent to be 
challenged and revoked, thus again increasing the probability of realizing the increased duopoly 
profits.  
  The effect of a change in the legal costs incurred by the incumbent on the optimal level of 
patent breadth is determined by totally differentiating the optimality condition 
0 2 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( 0 ) ( ) (
2 = − Π +
∂
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b b b k b f  with respect to the optimal patent 
breadth, b
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    (27) 
Proposition 11 The effect of a change in the legal costs incurred by the incumbent on the optimal 





, for both the additive and the multiplicative formulations of the 
instantaneous probability of success, λ.   
Proof: 
From the S.O.C. the term  0 < − b b k f . In addition,  1 =
T C k  while  0 =







  The results of Proposition 11 are as expected. The more expensive it becomes for the 
incumbent to defend the patent during a patent validity challenge, the less willing is the incumbent 
to risk having the patent challenged. The incumbent decreases the probability of having the patent 
challenged by decreasing the breadth of patent protection.  
  Finally, the effect of a change in the discount rate on the optimal patent breadth is 
determined by totally differentiating the optimality condition   33
0 2 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( 0 ) ( ) (
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b b b k b f  with respect to the optimal patent 
breadth, b
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m d d m d b x b
r
.  
The sign of the term  r f  cannot be determined without knowledge of the magnitude of the 




 is inconclusive.  
  To summarize, the incumbent’s optimal patent breadth choice depends on the level of 
monopoly profits that the incumbent realizes for as long as the entrant does not succeed in 
generating a non-infringing process, the level of duopoly profits realized by the incumbent once the 
entrant succeeds, the legal costs incurred during the patent challenge process and the discount rate. 
Claiming the maximum breadth of patent protection (bmax=1) is not a profit maximizing strategy for 
the entrant in this model. The effect of a change in the level of monopoly and duopoly profits on the 
optimal patent breadth depends on the initial optimal patent breadth value. The effect of a change in 
the legal costs incurred by the incumbent during the patent challenge process on the optimal patent 
breadth choice is always negative while the effect of a change in the discount rate on the optimal 
patent breadth choice is inconclusive.   
4.  Concluding Remarks 
The paper uses a simple game theoretic model to model and to examine the determination of the 
optimal patent breadth for the innovator of a drastic process innovation. The optimal patent breadth 
for the innovator is the breadth of patent protection that maximizes the innovator’s ability to 
appropriate innovation rents. The game consists of two players, an incumbent innovator who having   34
generated a drastic process innovation and having decided to patent it determines the breadth of 
patent protection and an entrant who decides how much to spend on R&D to generate her own 
process.    
The innovator in this model acts strategically and with foresight. That is, the innovator takes 
into consideration the entrant’s response to his choice of patent breadth and the possibility that he 
may have to defend the validity of his patent when he determines the optimal breadth of patent 
protection claimed. The model allows for the probability that the patent will be challenged by a 
third party as soon as the patent is granted. The probability that the patent will be challenged and the 
probability that the validity of the patent will be upheld depend on the breadth of patent protection. 
The possibility of patent infringement is not considered in this model. It is thus assumed that if the 
entrant enters, she will do so without infringing the patent.  
In this model, the R&D process is stochastic and the instantaneous probability of success is 
either additively or multiplicatively separable in the entrant’s flow of R&D spending and in the 
incumbent’s patent breadth choice. It is assumed that when success is realized by the entrant, her 
process is as efficient as the incumbent’s process in producing the non-patentable product. Both 
players use their processes for the production of a new non-patentable product which is viewed as a 
homogenous product by consumers.  
The results show that when the patent is revoked the entrant enters the market using the 
incumbent’s process. When the patent is not challenged or is challenged and upheld, the entrant’s 
optimal flow of R&D spending depends on the breadth of patent protection, the duopoly profits that 
the entrant will realize upon success and the discount rate. The effect of patent breadth on the 
entrant’s optimal flow of R&D spending is positive or negative depending on whether the 
instantaneous probability of success is additively or multiplicatively separable, respectively, on the 
flow of R&D spending and on patent breadth. The duopoly profits have a positive effect on the 
optimal flow of R&D spending while the effect of the discount rate on the optimal flow of R&D 
spending is inconclusive.  
The optimal breadth of patent protection depends on the level of monopoly profits realized 
by the incumbent during the period that the entrant undertakes R&D, the level of duopoly profits 
realized once the entrant succeeds, the legal costs incurred by the incumbent during the patent 
challenge process and the discount rate. The effect of the monopoly and the duopoly profits on the 
optimal patent breadth choice depends on the initial patent breadth value. The incumbent’s legal   35
costs have a negative effect on the optimal patent breadth while the effect of the discount rate on the 
optimal patent breadth is inconclusive. 
The results show that there may exist a patent breadth that deters entry, but it may not be 
optimal for the incumbent to choose this patent breadth and deter entry. The results also show that 
claiming the maximum breadth of patent protection (bmax=1) is never an optimal strategy for the 
incumbent in this model. The results hold under the assumption of no patent infringement which 
implies that patent breadth affects the entrant’s probability of success. If infringement was an option 
for the entrant then if the entrant found it optimal to infringe the patent, patent breadth would not 
have a binding effect on the entrant’s probability of generating an infringing process. The results 
also depend on the assumption that the patent validity is challenged only by a third party. If the 
model allowed for a validity challenge by the entrant, as well as by a third party, then the optimal 
patent breadth might have been narrower. In addition, it has been assumed that there is only one 
entrant, that the patent life is infinite and that entry deterrence is either not possible or is not an 
optimal choice for the incumbent. Relaxing the above assumptions is the focus of future research.  
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The above inequality holds ∀ θ∈(0,1), b∈(0,1] and r∈[0,1]. 
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The above inequality holds ∀ θ∈(0,1), b∈(0,1] and r∈[0,1]. □ 
 Proposition 9  
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